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Blue States, Red States: The United States?*
CATHERINE POWELL†

INTRODUCTION
This essay focuses on the role of states, cities, and other
subnational jurisdictions (collectively “localities”) in local
incorporation of international law norms aimed at protecting the
climate and immigrants. As a case study, this essay considers local
innovation in climate and immigration policy in the United States
within the twin concepts of federalism and glocalization—the
interaction between “global scripts” and “local norms.”1 In a parallel
project, I analyze climate change and immigration in developing a
© 2020 Catherine Powell.
*
In Barack Obama’s 2008 presidential election victory speech, he reiterated an idea he
had popularized: “Americans sent a message to the world that we have never been [just a
collection of individuals or] a collection of red states and blue states. We are, and always will
be, the United States of America.” Barack Obama, President-Elect, 2008 Presidential Victory
Speech (Nov. 4, 2008) (transcript available on National Public Radio website),
https://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=96624326.
†
Professor of Law, Fordham University School of Law; White House National Security
Council Director for Human Rights (on detail 2011); Secretary of State Policy Planning Staff
(2009-12).
For feedback on an earlier draft of this essay, the author would like to thank the conveners
of and participants in the University of Milan, European Discussion Group on “Constitutional
Principle or Political Process? The Future of Federalism in Comparative Perspective”
(October 2019). I also want to express gratitude to my research assistant at Fordham Law
School, Mary Katherine Cunningham. Finally, as this essay is going to press, the COVD-19
pandemic has ravaged communities across the globe, posing enormous challenges for
governance at every level. While I am not able to account for these challenges in this essay—
other than identifying avenues for potential future research in the conclusion—I dedicate this
essay to those whose lives were lost during the pandemic and the loved ones they leave behind.
1. See Roland Robertson, Glocalization: Time-Space and Homogeneity-Heterogeneity,
in GLOBAL MODERNITIES 25, 28 (Michael Featherstone et al. eds., 1995); see also John
Gillespie, Developing a Framework for Understanding the Localisation of Global Scripts in
East Asia, in THEORISING THE GLOBAL LEGAL ORDER 209, 209 n.2 (Andrew Halpin & Volker
Roeben eds., 2009) (defining “global scripts” as “the globalization of norms, standards,
principles and rules”).
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theory about federalism to justify lawmaking from above and below
the nation-state as a critical role in addressing national political market
failures—particularly when: (1) underrepresented minorities
are systematically locked out of the political process (as immigrants
quintessentially
are)
or,
by
contrast,
(2) influential
minorities can externalize the costs of their negative conduct through
regulatory capture (as the fossil fuel sector in the climate context).2
The present essay builds on that project, but investigates a
different dynamic. Taking as a given my point about the circumstances
justifying local innovation to address particular failures of national
politics, this essay looks to the process of transplanting legal norms
across jurisdictions—horizontally and vertically. Since my starting
point is that local innovation and transplantation of innovative ideas is
useful under defined circumstances, this essay takes a closer look at
the efficacy of federalism and glocalization as processes for tipping
norms and creating norm cascades3 to address the negative
distributional consequences of national policies.
In examining the political geography of debates on climate and
immigration law, this essay explores how both federalism and (its
close cousin) glocalization serve as mechanisms for not only managing
and shaping polite disagreement, but sharpening and consolidating
forceful resistance to significant threats to rule of law we face today.
More generally, political polarization and the “Big Sort” have resulted
in a divide between blue states and red states on a range of issues.4
2. Portions of this Essay are substantially drawn from my earlier, parallel project. See
Catherine Powell, We the People: These United Divided States, 40 CARDOZO L. REV. 2685,
2690 (2019) (adapting John Hart Ely’s concept of judicial review, which focuses on horizontal
separation of powers, to develop a theory of federalism, that is, vertical separation of powers).
For further discussion of the broader normative framework, see also JOHN HART ELY,
DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 103 (Harv. Univ. Press, 1980) (Ely famously notes: Malfunction
occurs when the process is undeserving of trust, when (1) the ins are choking off the channels
of political change to ensure that they will stay in and the outs will stay out, or (2) though, no
one is actually denied a voice or a vote, representatives beholden to an effective majority are
systematically disadvantaging some minority[.]). See also Nestor Davidson, The Dilemma of
Localism in an Era of Polarization, 128 YALE L. J. 956, 960-62 (2019) (articulating parallel
theory that involves intertwining structure and normativity in determining when local
innovation is warranted).
3. Martha Finnemore & Kathryn Sikkink, International Norm Dynamics and Political
Change, 52 INT’L ORG. 887, 893 (1998).
4. See generally Bill Bishop & Robert Cushing, The Big Sort: Migration, Economy and
Politics in the United States of “Those people”, (Feb. 29, 2008),
https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2012/04/0228_america_bishopppt.pdf
(describing trend for more people to live in proximity to others with similar views). Thanks to
Vicki Jackson for drawing my attention to this book. Vicki C. Jackson, The Democratic Deficit
of United States Federalism? Red State, Blue State, Purple?, 46 Fed. L. Rev. 645, 662 n.76,
663 (2018), https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/pdf/10.1177/0067205X1804600410. As
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What is particularly interesting about the climate change and
immigration disputes is that they are both inherently transnational
matters (regarding, respectively, the future of the planet and the global
labor supply).5
On the climate side, in the wake of President Trump’s
announcement in summer of 2017 that he will withdraw the United
States from the 2015 Paris Agreement on climate change, California
Governor Jerry Brown called on the President to fight climate change
or to “get out of the way” while the rest of the world works to reduce
emissions and invest in clean energy.6 Similarly, former New York
City Mayor Michael Bloomberg, now a UN Special Envoy for Cities
and Climate Change, said, “If Washington won’t lead, the mayors and
governors will.”7 Indeed, Trump’s plans to withdraw has not only met
with widespread criticism and derision abroad and at home, it arguably
sparked greater action, with numerous U.S. mayors and governors
pledging to meet emissions-reductions goals outlined in the
agreement.8
Professor Jackson notes, some disagree with Bishop’s analysis. See Id. at 662 n.76; see also
Samuel J. Abrams & Morris Fiorina, The Myth of the “Big Sort”, HOOVER DIGEST (Aug. 13,
2012), https://www.hoover.org/research/myth-big-sort.
5. What is often referred to as the “immigration” debate also implicates political
refugees—along with economic (or labor) migrants—to the extent we can draw a line between
the two categories. President Trump has sought to eviscerate who counts as a refugee as well,
by: narrowing who qualifies for refugee status (through eliminating domestic violence-based
asylum, for example); lowering the refugee admissions ceiling; stopping refugees before they
arrive at the U.S. southern border (through designating Mexico a “safe third country” under a
new “third-country asylum rule); and restricting public assistance to foreign-born legal
residents. For further discussion on how Trump uses not only race, but gender tropes to restrict
immigration and asylum protections, See, e.g., Catherine Powell, Race, Gender, and Nation
in an Age of Shifting Borders, UCLA J. of INT’L L. & FOR’N AFF. 133 (2020).
6. The Latest: Jerry Brown to Trump: “Get out of the way,” THE ASSOCIATED PRESS
(Dec. 12, 2017), https://apnews.com/1098c54326f14a61b149e4e2030a40f4.
7. Jonathan Watts, Alternative US group honouring Paris climate accord demands ‘seat
at the table’ – The America Pledge group claims to represent US majority opinion on carbon
emissions, despite Trump’s withdrawal from the Paris agreement, THE GUARDIAN (Nov. 11,
2017),
https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2017/nov/11/alternative-us-grouphonouring-paris-climate-accord-demands-seat-at-the-table-bonn.
8. We might understand this reaction to Trump’s threatened withdrawal within the
context of the literature on backlash, even though the response here is to the White House, not
a court decision. Cf. William N. Eskridge, Jr., Pluralism and Distrust: How Courts Can
Support Democracy By Lowering the Stakes of Politics, 114 YALE L. J 1279, 1326 (2005)
(arguing that courts should avoid rulings like Roe v. Wade and Bowers v. Hardwick because
of backlash, where Roe forced traditionalists to exit American politics, while Bowers
prevented gays from entering it); see generally Michael J. Klareman, How Brown Changed
Race Relations: The Backlash Thesis, 81 J. AM HIST. 81 (1994) (analyzing backlash to Brown);
see also Cass R. Sunstein, Three Civil Rights Fallacies, 79 CAL. L. REV. 751, 766 (1991)
(discussing backlash against Roe v. Wade and attributing the birth of the Moral Majority to the
case). But see Robert Post & Reva Siegel, Roe Rage: Democratic Constitutionalism and
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On the immigration side, a similar dynamic is playing out, where
Trump has vowed to “end” sanctuary jurisdictions, which extend
varying levels of protection (or “sanctuary”) to immigrants. Despite
Trump’s threats to cut these jurisdictions off from federal funding for
failure to cooperate with his draconian deportation policies,9 a growing
number of state and local governments are refusing to participate in the
enforcement of federal immigration law by disentangling their
criminal justice systems from the federal immigration regime. Rather
than using an era of mass incarceration to facilitate a new era of mass
deportation, these jurisdictions have adopted a set of reforms to protect
immigrants from deportation when they interact with the criminal
justice system.10
While Donald Trump remains a huge obstacle to protecting the
climate and immigrants, localities in the United States are playing a
large role in adopting protective measures—encouraging other
subnational jurisdictions to do the same and building support for these
norms across the country for potential uptake by national leaders in the
future. Scholarly analyses of such bottom-up governance fits within
the trend toward popular constitutionalism that has become widespread
among constitutional law theorists,11 as well as the embrace of
devolution and decentralized authority which animate core doctrine in
international law.12

Backlash, 42 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. (2007) (responding to Eskridge, Klareman, and
Sunstein and proposing a theory about democratic constitutionalism to rebut concerns about
backlash).
9. Exec. Order No. 13768, 82 Fed. Reg. 8799 (Jan. 25, 2017).
10. See generally Christopher N. Lasch et al., Understanding “Sanctuary Cities, 58 B.C.
L. REV. 1703 (2018).
11. See, e.g., Michael C. Dorf & Charles F. Sabel, A Constitution of Democratic
Experimentalism, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 267 (1998); LARRY D. KRAMER, THE PEOPLE
THEMSELVES: POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM AND JUDICIAL REVIEW (Oxford Univ. Press
2004); MARK TUSHNET, TAKING THE CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM THE COURTS (Princeton Univ.
Press 1999).
12. See, e.g., Oslo, The Principle of Complementarity and the Exercise of Universal
Jurisdiction for Core International Crimes, FORUM FOR INT’L HUMAN. L. (Sept. 4, 2009),
https://www.fichl.org/activities/the-principle-of-complementarity-and-the-exercise-ofuniversal-jurisdiction-for-core-international-crimes/ (“The complementarity principle on
which the International Criminal Court (ICC) is based entails that the ICC can only investigate
and prosecute core international crimes when national jurisdictions are unable or unwilling to
do so genuinely”); Charles F. Sabel & Jonathan Zeitlin, Learning from Difference: The New
Architecture of Experimentalist Governance in the European Union, EURO. GOV. PAPERS
(2007) (noting, “Subsidiarity in this architecture implies that in writing framework rules the
lower-level units should be given sufficient autonomy in implementing the rules to be able to
propose changes to them”) (citing EU scholar, Gráinne de Búrca).
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I. GLOCALIZATION IN AN AGE OF TRUMP
As an entanglement process between global scripts and local
norms, glocalization is not necessarily a one-way process, “but rather
is a mutual interactive process among different” sites.13 Scholars have
described this interaction as “dialogue,”14 the “diffusion of law,”15 or a
“‘creole’ situation bounded by the macro flow of normative ideas
through various legal traditions.”16 Beyond involving a mere drawing
down or uncritical transmission of norms, at its best, glocalization
allows for critical engagement with new norms, so community
members can remake and translate law to fit their own circumstances.17
The climate and immigration debates reflect this critical
engagement. While these debates largely map onto the blue state/red
state divide, localities adopting legal policies to protect the
environment and immigrants are often grounded in local, pragmatic
“states’ rights” and “local sovereignty” concerns—values often
embraced by conservatives. At the same time, subnational climate and
immigration policy innovation reflects local manifestations of the
international realities of a warming planet and the rights of individuals,
regardless of status. Even if not self-styled as part of “The Resistance”
to Donald Trump’s “America First” perspective,18 these local policies
13. Fan Kun, Globalization of Arbitration: Transnational Standards Struggling with
Local Norms Through the Lens of Arbitration Transplantation in China, 18 HARV. NEGOT.
L.J. 175, 186 (2013).
14. See, e.g., Anne-Marie Slaughter, A New World Order (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 2004) (on “dialogue” among judges of different nations).
15. William Twining, Diffusion of Law: A Global Perspective, 49 J. LEGAL PLURALISM
& UNOFFICIAL L. (2004).
16. See Kun, supra note 13.
17. For a discussion of the importance of translation, rather than mere transmission of
law, see Catherine Powell, Lifting Our Veil of Ignorance: Culture, Constitutionalism, and
Women’s Human Rights in Post-September 11 America, 37 HASTINGS L. J. 331, 375 (20052006); see Karen Knop, Here and There: International Law and Domestic Courts, 32 N.Y.U.
J. INT’L L. & POL. 501, 504-05 (2000); see also Harold Koh, Transnational Legal Process, 75
NEB. L. REV. 181, 184 (1996); Catherine Powell, Dialogic Federalism: Constitutional
Possibilities for Incorporation of Human Rights Law in the United States, 150 U. PA. L. REV.
245, 251 (2001) (arguing that the translation metaphor is particularly well-suited to the U.S.
context because it describes the foreignness that many Americans associate with international
law); Madhavi Sunder, Piercing the Veil, 112 YALE L.J. 1401, 1444 (2003) (describing
translation as a core empowerment strategy used by feminists in Muslim countries where
women are reconceiving human rights in ways that are relevant to their particular local
religious and cultural contexts).
18. I am not referring to Trump’s “America First” slogan as “nationalist,” because the
slogan itself is a distortion of what policies are truly in the United States’ interest, even on
realist grounds. Elsewhere, I (and many other scholars) have discussed how U.S. interests are
not fixed, but constantly reshaped and redefined through interaction with other states and
international institutions (per the constructivist theory of international relations theory). See
generally Hans Peter Schmitz and Kathryn Sikkink, “International Human Rights”, in
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are often geared toward disentanglement from federal government
policies that advance the President’s climate denialism and antiimmigrant stance. On the opposite end of the spectrum, emboldened
in part by Trump’s narrow populist cri de coeur, other subnational
jurisdictions have adopted or even doubled-down on the President’s
policies, in some instances setting up a direct clash between red states
(such as Texas) and blue cities (such as Austin).19
Rather than characterize this clash as a divide between globalists
and nationalists, this essay views the climate and immigration debates
as disagreements about nation—what type of nation the United States
is (and is becoming) internally and how to project U.S. leadership
externally with regard to existential questions concerning the future of
the planet and the future of humanity. As regards the future of the
planet (and the role of the United States in it), recent UN and U.S.
government reports indicate that the effects of climate change are
likely to become dire by 2040, far earlier than previously thought, if
greenhouse gas emissions (and the resulting warming of the
atmosphere) continue at the current rate, unless rapid steps are taken
to transform the world’s economy.20 As regards the future of our role
as humans, while Trump blames immigrants for “taking your jobs,”21
many studies indicate that the workplace is on the cusp of
transformation involving large scale job displacement as a result of
technology and automation of jobs, due to the rise of artificial
intelligence.22 If Trump were truly concerned about jobs, this is the
HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS (Walter Carlsnaes, Thomas Risse, and Beth A.
Simmons eds. 2013).
19. For discussion of anti-sanctuary localism, see generally Pratheepan Gulasekaram, et
al., State Anti-Sanctuary & Immigration Localism, 119 COLUM. L. REV. 837 (2019).
20. Coral Davenport, Major Climate Report Describes a Strong Risk of Crisis as Early
as 2040, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 7, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/07/climate/ipccclimate-report-2040.html (reporting on UN reports findings and recommendations, including
necessary steps to address climate change – such as reducing carbon dioxide emissions – but
speculating that such measures are politically impossible under Trump). See also Coral
Davenport & Kendra Pierre-Louis, U.S. Climate Report Warns of Damaged Environment and
Shrinking
Economy,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Nov.
23,
2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/11/23/climate/us-climate-report.html (reporting that “if
significant steps are not taken to rein in global warming, the damage will knock as much as
10 percent off the size of the American economy by century’s end… American exports and
supply chains could be disrupted, agricultural yields could fall to 1980s levels by midcentury
and fire season could spread to the Southeast”).
21. Donald
Trump,
CPAC
Speech
(Mar.
6,
2014)
https://www.washingtonpost.com/video/politics/trump-immigrants-are-taking-yourjobs/2014/03/06/6998bb82-a576-11e3-b865-38b254d92063_video.html.
22. MCKINSEY GLOBAL INSTITUTE, Jobs Lost, Jobs Gained: Workforce Transitions in a
Time
of
Automation,
at
51
(Dec.
2017),
https://www.mckinsey.com/~/media/mckinsey/featured%20insights/future%20of%20organiz
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challenge he would be focused on, not immigrants.
The climate and immigration debates reflect ways that
glocalization involves not only a drawing down of global norms to the
local, but also a scaling up and diffusion of norms across jurisdictions.
As one scholar notes: “On the one hand, global processes are
incorporated into the local setting—‘localized globalism’ or ‘microglobalization.’ On the other hand, local ideals, practices, and
institutions are also projected onto global scenes— “globalized
localism” or “macro-localization.”23
Federalism scholars have made similar observations, using
concepts such as “iterative federalism”24 to describe how localities can
scale-up innovation, spurring the federal government to act (and vice
versa). Even though U.S. Supreme Court precedent tells us that the
federal government has authority over environmental and immigration
policy,25 the Court has recognized a role for subnational governments
as well.26

ations/what%20the%20future%20of%20work%20will%20mean%20for%20jobs%20skills%
20and%20wages/mgi%20jobs%20lost-jobs%20gained_report_december%202017.ashx
(reporting that up to 30 percent of jobs may be displaced by 2030, though many jobs will be
created – perhaps more than will be lost, but will require reskilling and retraining); Illanes, et
al., Retraining and Reskilling Workers in an Age of Automation, MCKINSEY GLOBAL
INSTITUTE
(Jan.
2018),
https://www.mckinsey.com/featured-insights/future-ofwork/retraining-and-reskilling-workers-in-the-age-of-automation?cid=eml-web (indicating
that “in terms of magnitude, [this transition] is akin to coping with the large-scale shift from
agricultural work to manufacturing that occurred in the early 20th century in North America and
Europe, and more recently in China.”).
23. Fan Kun, Glocalization of Arbitration at 253-54.
24. Ann Carlson, Iterative Federalism and Climate Change, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 1097,
1099 (2009).
25. Regarding environment law, the Supreme Court upheld the federal government
authority in regulating the environment based on the role of the national government as a
sovereign nation involved in negotiating the global commons with other nations, rejecting a
10th Amendment challenge. See Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416 (1920). Similarly,
immigration is understood to be bound up in the federal government’s control over matters
related to sovereignty and foreign affairs. See generally Jennifer Gordon, Immigration as
Commerce: A New Look at the Federal Immigration Power and the Constitution, 93 IND. L.J.
653 (2018).
26. Regarding environment law, see, e.g., Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 524-25
(2007) (agreeing with Massachusetts and the other states, the Court found the federal EPA’s
rationale for not regulating particular greenhouse gas emissions from motor vehicles under the
Clean Air Act to be inadequate and required the agency to articulate a reasonable basis in order
to avoid regulation). Regarding immigration law, see, e.g., Cty. of Santa Clara v. Trump, 250
F. Supp. 3d 497, 539 (N.D. Cal. 2017) (granting preliminary injunction and finding likelihood
of success on the merits of the plaintiffs’ claim that President Trump’s Executive Order 13758
(threatening to defund “sanctuary jurisdictions”) is unconstitutional on the grounds that it
violates both horizontal and vertical separation of powers concerns). The Northern District of
California also denied a renewed motion to dismiss from the government, holding the city of
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The current context calls for urgent analysis of the possibilities
for interaction between local and global, given the rise of President
Donald Trump, who regularly assaults the independence of the
judiciary and the press, checks and balances, rule of law, the rights of
minorities and women, transparency and truth, and other fundamental
pillars of democracy. Growing out of the western enlightenment
period, the American and French revolutions popularized these
essential constitutional guarantees, which were eventually
internationalized and universalized through the global human rights
movement in the aftermath of World War II.27
II. CLIMATE CHANGE
Trump’s vow to withdraw from the Paris climate accord
galvanized bottom-up local climate policy innovation. While localities
have long played a role in local environmental concerns, such as
pollution-control, the 2018 National Climate Assessment confirms, “a
growing number of states, cities, and businesses have pursued or
deepened initiatives aimed at reducing [greenhouse gas] emissions.”28
Local innovation with climate policy is not only drawing down on
international climate commitments, but is also being channeled back
up through participation in global meetings and bi-lateral negotiations
between U.S. localities and foreign governments, given that the green
economy is seen as a profitable market for many localities worldwide.29

San Francisco had demonstrated a "real and immediate controversy" between itself and the
federal government. Cty. of Santa Clara v. Trump, 267 F.Supp.3d 1201, 1216 (N.D. Cal.
2017). Note that the Trump administration has also sued California, claiming that California
sanctuary laws “reflect a deliberate effort by California to obstruct the United States’
enforcement of federal immigration law.” See Katie Benner & Jennifer Medina, Trump
Administration Sues California Over Immigration Laws, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 6, 2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/06/us/politics/justice-department-california-sanctuarycities.html. The Eastern District of California has granted in part and denied in part the United
States’ motion for preliminary injunction, in a case which, at the time of this writing, is
pending certiorari per the Trump administration’s request. See generally United States v.
California, 314 F. Supp. 3d 1077 (E.D. Cal. 2018 2018), aff’d in part, rev’d in part and
remanded, 921 F.3d 865 (9th Cir. 2019), cert. denied, 207 L. ed. 2d 1072 (2020).
27. See LOUIS HENKIN, THE RIGHTS OF MAN TODAY 21-25 (1979). More broadly, U.S.
leadership helped pave the way for the establishment of modern international law and
institutions, following the war, which laid the foundation for international legal principles
concerning the environment and basic human rights for all, regardless of status.
28. U.S. GLOB. CHANGE RES. PROG., Fourth Nat’l Climate Assmt., Chapter 29, at 1347
(2018), https://nca2018.globalchange.gov/downloads/NCA4_Ch29_Mitigation_Full.pdf.
29. See generally Powell, supra note 4, at 2705-14 (discussing how the Paris Climate
Accord facilitates this form of bottom up lawmaking).
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In fact, state and local governments in the United States, across
party lines, have a long history of involvement in addressing climate
change and in spurring the federal government to act through a form
of iterative federalism.30 Because of the problems of traffic and smog
in the Los Angeles area, California had an early incentive to act in
ways that few other states did. In 1967, then California State Governor
Ronald Reagan signed legislation paving the way for the state to
strictly curb auto vehicle emissions.31
While a strong federal role can address the tragedy of the
commons problem in environmental law, climate change is also a
tipping problem.32 Given that states, such as California in the
automobile context (and Gulf states in the context of rising sea levels
and the problem of flooding), are affected by climate change in
disparate ways, certain states in fact do have incentives to be first
movers to address local issues with global dimensions.
Congress had preempted other states from adopting “any standard
relating to the control of emissions from new motor vehicles,” but it
exempted California.33 In effect, the federal government quasideputized California as a “superregulator,” wherein other states could
chose to follow the federal or the California standard.34 Because
California has the largest automobile market in the country, most
manufacturers opt to follow the California (more stringent) standard.
As a laboratory of experimentation, California was able to take on the
risks (and enjoy the benefits) of innovation. By allowing California to
experiment, some costly missteps were limited to one jurisdiction,
providing opportunities for learning and improvement as policy
innovation was taken up at the federal level.35 The Obama
administration provided a waiver for California’s progressively more
stringent auto emission standards.
While Trump announced he was revoking the Obama waiver,
30. Ann Carlson, Iterative Federalism and Climate Change, 103 NW L. REV. 1097, 1100
(2009).
31. Jody Freeman, Trump’s Biggest Climate Move Yet is Bad for Everyone, N.Y. TIMES
(Aug. 2, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/08/02/opinion/trumps-biggest-climate-moveyet-is-bad-foreveryone.html?action=click&module=RelatedCoverage&pgtype=Article&region=Footer.
32. Thomas E. Hale, Catalytic Institutions for the Global Commons: Tragedy or Tipping
Point?,
PERRY
WORLD
HOUSE
&
UNIV.
PA.,
at
16
(2017),
https://global.upenn.edu/sites/default/files/halepaper.original.pdf.
33. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1857f-1(a), 1857f-6(a) (Supp. IV. 1965-1968) (1967 amendment to the
Clean Air Act); see Carlson, supra note 26, at 1111.
34. Carlson, supra note 24, at 1100.
35. Id. at 1137-38.
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California (and 23 other states) have filed suit against the revocation.36
Trump’s proposal to revoke the waiver sets the stage for a legal
conflict that could split the nation’s auto market in two—“[o]ne for
California and the dozen other aligned states that account for one-third
of the U.S. auto market, and another for the rest of the country”37 – a
situation that auto company executives themselves want to avoid.38
A. Localities to Trump: “Get Out of the Way”
Since President Trump’s announcement to withdraw from the
Paris climate accord, state and local engagement in global
environmental governance is on the rise in a visible, coordinated,
networked fashion. By attending international meetings of statesparties to the Paris agreement (and through their actions and statements
at home), state and local government officials have pledged to fight for
the commitments the United States made through the Paris process—
in the absence of federal leadership (and more to the point, in the
presence of federal hostility).
In so doing, these state and local leaders are embracing a shared
community (at least concerning our shared planet and climate) that is
both local and global—and that concerns “We the People” today and
“We the People” tomorrow (future generations). Thus, these
commitments are being made not only transnationally, but transtemporally. These leaders are forcefully rebutting the efforts of
powerful economic interests to externalize their responsibility for the
costs of climate change to the rest of us, both at home and abroad, for
today’s and future generations. While state and local officials ground
their primary concerns in their unique local pragmatic priorities, these
leaders have also linked these very concrete concerns to the global
(indeed planetary) phenomenon of climate change and the recognition
that we are all in this together (in a quite existential way) and depend
on cooperation with each other.
Localities became visibly more engaged in global governance
36. Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, Cal., et al. v. Chao, et al., (2019)
(No. 1:19-cv-02826).
37. Tony Barboza, California counters Trump on car emissions standards, expands other
climate rules, L.A. TIMES (Sept. 28, 2018), https://www.latimes.com/local/lanow/la-mecarbon-fuels-20180928-story.html.
38. See Coral Davenport, Trump Administration Unveils Its Plan to Relax Car Pollution
Rules, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 2, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/08/02/climate/trump-autoemissions-california.html (The Trump administration “proposal goes much further than many
major automakers wanted, and manufacturers are now worried that years of legal challenges
and regulatory uncertainty could complicate their business.”).
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during the December 2017 UN climate talks in Bonn, Germany—a
meeting marking the second anniversary of the Paris accord. The
White House sent a small delegation to in Bonn climate talks,
Germany.39 While the official U.S. delegation scheduled a meeting to
discuss the future of coal, an alternative, high-level, bi-partisan
coalition, including California Governor Jerry Brown, former New
York City Mayor Michael Bloomberg, and several senators, mayors,
and business leaders, launched the “America Pledge” report.40
Demanding a “seat at the table” in Bonn, Bloomberg—who is also a
UN special enjoy for cities and climate change—said of the America
Pledge group, “If this group were a country, we’d be the third-biggest
economy in the world.”41 Citing recent violent wildfires in California
as an example of extreme weather made worse by human-made climate
change, Governor Brown noted that “the fires are burning in California
[and] [t]hey’ll be burning in France, burning all around the world” if
countries fail to reduce emissions.42
That same month, in another bi-partisan initiative, led by Chicago
Mayor Rahm Emmanuel, more than fifty mayors from across the
United States and Canada participated in the North American Climate
Summit in Chicago. The group of mayors signed “an official
agreement, the Chicago Climate Charter, in which they pledged to
meet the emissions-reduction goals set out by the Paris agreement.”43
In September 2018, California Governor Brown hosted a
39. See Umair Irfan, The Trump Administration went to the UN climate talks to promote
coal,
VOX
(Nov.
14,
2017),
https://www.vox.com/energy-andenvironment/2017/11/14/16634480/us-coal-nuclear-climate-change-cop23-protest (In fact,
“rather than sending high-level Cabinet secretaries to the meeting as the Obama White House
did, the U.S. delegation is being led by Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs Thomas
A. Shannon, Jr.”).
40. Jonathan Watts, Alternative US group honouring Paris climate accord demands ‘seat
at the table’ – The America Pledge group claims to represent US majority opinion on carbon
emissions, despite Trump’s withdrawal from the Paris agreement, GUARDIAN (Nov. 11, 2017),
https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2017/nov/11/alternative-us-group-honouringparis-climate-accord-demands-seat-at-the-table-bonn.
41. Id.
42. The Associated Press, The Latest: Jerry Brown to Trump: “Get out of the way,” ABC
NEWS (Dec. 12, 2017), https://apnews.com/1098c54326f14a61b149e4e2030a40f4. For
analysis of other ways that state and local governments have played a role in advancing
international environmental and other policy goals, see, e.g., BENJAMIN R. BARBER, IF
MAYORS RULED THE WORLD: DYSFUNCTIONAL NATIONS, RISING CITIES (Yale Univ. Press)
(2013).
43. Jeremy Berke, More than 50 US mayors just signed a charter to meet the Paris
agreement goals without Trump, THE BUSINESS INSIDER (Dec. 12, 2017),
https://www.businessinsider.com/paris-agreement-2-year-anniversary-us-mayors-step-up2017-12.
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domestic climate change conference in San Francisco, featuring
representatives of sub-national governments, businesses, investors,
musicians, and others to highlight action that could “spur deeper
commitment” from national governments to fight global warming.44 A
coalition of 16 states, Puerto Rico, hundreds of cities, and almost 2,000
businesses have pledged to ensure that the United States meets former
President Obama’s Paris pledge to cut greenhouse gas emissions 26 to
28 percent below 2005 levels by 2025.45 However, the group has
acknowledged that “United States emissions are on track to fall only
about 17 percent over that span” and that these “states and cities would
have to pursue ambitious new policies [] to get closer to the target” and
persuade “several other states beyond the blue coastal enclaves to join
them[.]”46
Even so, California Governor Brown has met with China’s chief
climate negotiator and “announced plans for California and China to
work together on zero-emissions vehicles and fuel-cell research[,]”
and “several blue-state governors met behind closed doors with the
environment ministers of Canada and Mexico to forge new
partnerships on issues like electric vehicles and curbing emissions of
methane[.]”47 While it is unusual for American governors to, in effect,
take the lead on international climate diplomacy, Canada’s Minister of
Environment and Climate Change notes, “It is important to show the
world that we’re still working with U.S. states,” and that “[t]here really
are practical things we can do together.”48
B. Protecting the Climate as a Tipping Problem
In considering the diffusion of policies aimed at climate change,
it is tempting to view the norm cascade sweeping through at least some
44. Mythili Sampathkumar, California launches new climate change conference to help
fulfill Paris Agreement targets – The U.S. is withdrawing from the deal, but states and cities
vow to continue fighting global warming, THE INDEPENDENT (July 6, 2017),
https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world-0/us-politics/california-climate-changeconference-paris-agreement-deal-targets-a7828076.html. Along with Governors from New
York, Maryland and Connecticut, Governor Brown’s team said they would work on new
regulations to restrict hydrofluorocarbons, extremely potent greenhouse gasses used in airconditioners and refrigerators. See Brad Plumer, California Had Its Own Climate Summit.
Now
What?,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Sept.
15,
2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/09/15/climate/california-climate-summit.html (noting “In
2016, nations agreed on a treaty to phase out these gases, but Mr. Trump has not submitted the
pact for ratification or written federal regulations.”).
45. See Plumer, supra note 45.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id.
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localities as motivated by a common purpose. Under the standard
tragedy of the commons analysis, we may assume that all jurisdictions
have similar, if not identical, motives.49 However, the fact that certain
jurisdictions have been first and more aggressive movers in reducing
greenhouse gas emissions, such as California, indicates different
interests and motives.
As international relations Professor Thomas Hale explains,
certain mitigation steps taken by particular jurisdictions may not even
be viewed as primarily climate policy per se:50 “[Rather,] [m]any ‘cobenefits’ can be gained [] including reducing local air pollution and
improving human health, increasing energy security and reliability,
developing new industrial sectors, preserving forests, [reducing
traffic,] ideational preferences, such as the value of upholding a ‘green’
policy[.]”51
For these reasons, it makes sense to assess climate policy not only
within the framework of the standard tragedy of the commons analysis,
but also to recognize that climate policy involves a “tipping problem
structure.”52 While Hale makes this point in the context of tipping
norms globally, I am adapting his insight applies with equal force
domestically.
In sum, the initiative of state and local governments in addressing
environmental protection concerns, such as climate change, is critical.
Certainly the federal government has an important coordination role to
play. But, in the meantime, the leadership of subfederal government
actors can build support for climate change policy across the nation
and, eventually, at the national level.
III. SANCTUARY JURISDICTIONS
A parallel bottom-up approach has unfolded in U.S. immigration
policy in the context of state, counties, and cities that have developed
“sanctuary” policies for immigrants. The term “sanctuary jurisdiction”
is itself somewhat of a misnomer today, in the sense that it now applies
to a range of localities motivated by a variety of concerns beyond the
original ones in the 1980s that were more geared toward providing true

49.
50.
51.
52.

See Hale, supra note 32.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 2.
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sanctuary from deportation.53
Unlike the climate context, international law norms protecting the
rights of immigrants are weak.54 During the first wave of sanctuary
policies – which was largely focused on political refugees (where
international law protections are stronger) in contrast to economic
migrants – sanctuary cities were in fact responding to what they
perceived as the federal government’s lack of compliance with
international law, based on the U.S. government’s rejection of refugee
applications from Central Americans.55 Along with the emergence of
these early sanctuary cities, religious activists in the church-centered
movement drew on the emerging use of international human rights
norms by U.S. advocates more broadly, invoking the principles of
personal accountability developed in the Nuremburg tribunals, to
justify what the federal government considered alien smuggling.56 But
the more recent waves of sanctuary policies have focused on
immigrants (not necessarily more narrowly on refugees), where there
is a dearth of binding international legal protections.
A. Typology of Sanctuary Policies aimed at Disentanglement
A study of over 3,000 counties identifies seven different types of
sanctuary policies.57 As counties become either increasingly or
53. American Immigration Council, Fact Sheet: Understanding Trust Acts, Community
Policing,
and
“Sanctuary
Cities,”
(Oct.
10,
2015),
https://www.americanimmigrationcouncil.org/research/sanctuary-cities-trust-acts-andcommunity-policing-explained.
54. See Catherine Powell, We the People: These United Divided States, 40 CARDOZO L.
REV. 2685, 2689 (2019).
55. See Rose Cuison Villazor, What is a Sanctuary?, 61 SMU L. REV. 133, 142-43 (2008)
(discussing that in the 1980s, municipalities – which we now refer to as “sanctuary cities” –
adopted non-cooperation policies alongside churches that provided safe havens to Central
American migrants).
56. Susan Gzesh, Central Americans and Asylum Policy in the Reagan Era, MIGRATION
POLICY INSTITUTE (Apr. 1, 2006), https://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/central-americansand-asylum-policy-reagan-era; see also Catherine Powell, The United Divided States: San
Francisco Sues Donald Trump for Sanctuary Cities Order, JUST SECURITY (Feb. 13, 2017),
https://www.justsecurity.org/37589/united-divided-states-san-francisco-sues-donald-trumpsanctuary-cities-order/.
57. See Immigration Legal Resource Center, The Rise of Sanctuary: Getting Local
Officers Out of the Business of Deportations in the Trump Era, IMMIGR. LEGAL RESOURCE
CTR. (Jan. 25, 2018), https://www.ilrc.org/sites/default/files/resources/rise_of_sanctuary-lg20180201.pdf (surveying 3,015 of the 3,140 countries and county equivalents in the United
States) [hereinafter ILRC, The Rise of Sanctuary]; see also Christopher N. Lasch, et al.,
Understanding “Sanctuary Cities,” 58 B.C. L. REV. 1703, 1723-36 (describing similar “types
of criminal justice policies that cities have adopted to disentangle their law enforcement
systems from federal immigration enforcement”). Note also that the Congressional Research
Service describes a useful typology by noting that sanctuary policies are often described as
falling under one of three categories: First, so-called “don’t enforce” policies generally bar the
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decreasingly disengaged from the federal immigration enforcement
regime, collectively, these counties could overtime tip these norms in
one way or another. The findings here illustrates trends that are
corroborated through qualitative research concerning the emergence of
a network of sanctuary jurisdictions that influence one another.58 By
adopting sanctuary policies—and “dissenting by deciding,” to use
Heather Gerken’s formulation59—“these multiple points of sanctuary
allow their specific constituencies, as well as broader local, state, and
national ones, to weigh competing conceptions of rule of law, moral
legitimacy, public safety outcomes, and social justice[.]”60
My description here begins with the category of sanctuary
policies that seek the least amount of disentanglement from the federal
immigration enforcement apparatus (and are the most common). The
subsequent categories discussed move up a spectrum of increasing
disengagement with Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE)
(with data referring to 2017, unless otherwise indicated):
Refusal to enter into 287(g) agreements: Ninety-eight percent of
counties did not have a 287(g) agreements with the federal
government.61 The 287(g) program involves an optional agreement
between the jurisdiction and ICE, which essentially deputizes
particular local law enforcement agents to enforce immigration laws.
Because such agreements are optional, it is fairly easy for counties to
opt against entering into such agreements.
No ICE Detention Contract: Nearly ninety-four percent of
counties did not have a contract with ICE.62 Such ICE detention
contracts are contracts between ICE and local jails, where ICE pays
the jails to hold immigrants in detention during their deportation
proceedings. As with 287(g) agreements, entering into an ICE
detention contract is also optional (though there are financial
state or local police from assisting federal immigration authorities. Second, “don’t ask”
policies generally bar certain state or local officials from inquiring into a person’s immigration
status. Third, “don’t tell” policies typically restrict information sharing between state or local
law enforcement and federal immigration authorities. See Sarah S. Herman, State and Local
“Sanctuary” Policies Limiting Participation in Immigration Enforcement, CONGRESSIONAL
RESEARCH SERVICE (March 23, 2017).
58. Rose Cuison Villazor & Pratheepan Gulasekaram, Sanctuary Networks, 103 MINN.
L. REV. 1209, 1251-52 (2019).
59. Heather K. Gerken, Dissenting by Deciding, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1745, 1747-51 (2005);
see also Jessica Bulman-Pozen & Heather K. Gerken, Uncooperative Federalism, 118 YALE
L. J. 1256, 1293-94 (2009).
60. Villazor, et al., supra note 58, at 1276.
61. ILRC, The Rise of Sanctuary, supra note 57, at 9.
62. Id.
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incentives to rent out space in local jails to ICE).
Limits on ICE Detainers (ICE Holds): Twenty-four percent of
counties have policies refusing to cooperate with ICE requests to hold
individuals beyond their release date, which would provide ICE with
additional time to take custody of these individuals—a practice
numerous officials in these jurisdictions view (and some courts have
held) violate the 4th Amendment rights of those detained.63
Restricting notifications to ICE about information, such as
release dates: Only six percent of counties had policies against sharing
information about detainees, such as release dates, with ICE.64 ICE
asks local agencies to provide advance notice of when immigrants will
be released from custody, so that ICE can arrest these individuals upon
release.
Limiting ICE access to local jails and ICE interrogations of
detainees: Only four percent of counties restrict ICE’s access to jails
or have put in place safeguards on ICE’s ability to interrogate
detainees.65
Prohibiting inquiries into immigration status and/or place of
birth: Only four percent of counties limit their officers from asking
individuals about their immigration status.66 General bans on
participating in immigration enforcement. Only four percent of
countries have a general rule against spending time or resources on
immigration enforcement.67
B. What Motivates Sanctuary Policies
As with climate policy, jurisdictions have different motivations for
adopting sanctuary policies,68 ranging from more pragmatic rationales
to human rights-oriented considerations.
1. Preserving Local Control over Criminal Justice
One reason for sanctuary policies (for example, in New Haven,
63. Id. at 9.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 9. Such counties may require a judicial warrant for ICE to access limited areas
or adopt procedural protections for imprisoned immigrants so that they can refuse
interrogation by ICE agents. Id. at 4
66. Id. at 9.
67. See id. (this might include restrictions on participating in joint operations involving
immigration enforcement).
68. See Lasch, et al., supra note 10, at 1752-71.
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Pittsburg, San Francisco) is to assert that state and local governments
should be in control of criminal justice priorities, separate and apart
from the federal government’s responsibilities over immigration
enforcement.69 These “don’t enforce” policies bar local criminal law
enforcement officials from federal civil immigration enforcement.
Drawing the line between these two spheres of authority is supported
by the Supreme Court’s federalism jurisprudence concerning the Tenth
Amendment. According to the Court’s anti-commandeering cases,70
the federal government cannot compel state and local governments
into participating in a federal regulatory program. At the same time,
criminal justice matters fall within the realm of traditional state and
local police powers.71
As the sanctuary policy in Cooks County, Illinois notes, “the
federal government only reimburses part of the costs associated with
ICE detainers”72—a classic concern of the Supreme Court’s anticommandeering jurisprudence. Moreover, in considering whether ICE
has violated the Fourth Amendment (by requesting that states and
localities hold immigrants beyond the release dates), at least some
courts have found that ICE detainer requests infringe on federalism and
the Tenth Amendment concerns.73 Furthermore, courts have enjoined
the provision in the President’s “sanctuary jurisdictions” Executive
Order that threatens to cut off funds to such jurisdictions, citing the
Spending Clause, reflecting Tenth Amendment concerns.74
2. Enhancing Community Trust and Community Policing
A second basis for sanctuary policies, which blends pragmatic
and human rights considerations, is the concern that the entanglement
of street-level policing in federal immigration enforcement
undermines the trust that is necessary for community members to feel
69. Id. at 1754-55.
70. See, e.g., New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992); Printz v. United States,
521 U.S. 898 (1997).
71. See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000) (“[t]he regulation and punishment
of intrastate violence . . . has always been the province of the states”); United States v. Lopez,
514 U.S. 549 (1995) (holding the prohibition on guns in school zones as “a general police
power of the sort retained by the States”).
72. Cook County, Ill. Ord. 11-O-73 (2011); see also Lasch, et al., supra note 10, at 1756,
n 270 (discussing similar concerns expressed in the sanctuary policies of California,
Philadelphia, PA, and Miami-Dade County).
73. See, e.g., Galarza v. Szalczyk, 745 F.3d 634, 645 (3d Cir. 2014).
74. See, e.g., Cty. of Santa Clara v. Trump, 250 F. Supp. 3d 497 (N.D. Cal. 2017)
(granting preliminary injunction and finding likelihood of success on the merits of the
plaintiffs’ claim that the EO is unconstitutional on the grounds that it violates both horizontal
and vertical separation of powers concerns).
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confident in cooperating with local law enforcement. A range of
sanctuary jurisdictions, including California, Milwaukee County, and
New Haven, have pointed to the importance of building community
trust as rationales for disengaging with federal immigration efforts.75
Trump’s hostile statements and policies toward immigrants have
renewed fears in immigrant communities that interaction with local
police (and other local authorities) will result in deportation.
As many studies have demonstrated, “[c]ommunity trust is
critical for effective policing programs.”76 Such fear “can cause
immigrants and individual in mixed status families to refrain from
coming forward as victims of, or witnesses to crime.”77 When reports
of sexual assaults and spousal abuse dropped among Latinos, in 2017,
the Los Angeles Police Department indicated that “deportation fears
may be preventing Hispanic members of the community from
reporting when they are victimized.”78
3. Averting Unlawful Arrests
A third ground for sanctuary policies, which also mixes pragmatic
and human rights considerations, is the concern that unlawful arrests
leads to legal and monetary liability. This concern has paved the way
for sanctuary policies in Oregon, Colorado, Washington, and
California, which have each declared they would no longer consent to
ICE detainer requests.79 Concerns about liability, as a result of
entanglement with federal immigration enforcement, have grown with
the emergence of crim-immigration.
Furthermore, three lines of cases actually cabin the ability of
states and localities to participate in making and enforcing immigration
law. First is Arizona v. United States,80 which struck down aspects of
Arizona’s SB 1070 as preempted by federal immigration law. A
second line of cases reflects a concern that federal immigration
detainers violate the Fourth Amendment.81 State and local law
75. Lasch, et al., supra note 10, at 1761-64.
76. Id. at 1761.
77. Id. at 1762. See also Nik Theodore, Insecure Communities: Latino Perceptions of
Police Involvement in Immigration Enforcement, POLICY LINK (May 2013),
http://raceandpolicing.issuelab-dev.org/resources/15261/15261.pdf (reporting on the impact
of police involvement in immigration enforcement on Latinos’ perceptions of public safety
and their willingness to contact the police).
78. News Release, L.A. Police Dep’t, Decline in Reporting of Crime Among Hispanic
Population (Mar. 21, 2017), http://www.lapdonline.org/home/news_view/61998.
79. Lasch, et al., supra note 10, at 1758-61.
80. Arizona v. United States, 567 U.S. 387 (2012).
81. See, e.g., Galarza v. Szalczyk, 745 F.3d 634, 645 (3d Cir. 2014); Miranda-Olivares
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enforcement officials (such as, prominently, then-California State
Attorney General Kamala Harris) have also expressed unease with
federal detainer requests and that cooperation with such requests could
expose states and localities to liability.82 A third line of cases “built on
the notion, reflected in some sanctuary policies, that civil immigration
arrests by local officials must not only be authorized by federal law but
by state or local law as well.”83
4. Securing Equal Protection
A fourth reason for sanctuary policies—which focuses more
directly and primarily on the question of human rights—is grounded
in two concerns based on equal protection: biased policing and
discriminatory access to police services.84 Many jurisdictions—
including East Haven, New Orleans, and Vermont—have adopted
sanctuary policies aimed at addressing these concerns.85
Even where race or ethnicity is not an explicit factor, entangling
police in immigration matters can incline officers to use race, ethnicity,
and English-language ability as proxies for immigration status, for
example, in determine who to stop, question, and investigate.86 Several
sanctuary policies reflect a concern with fair, nondiscriminatory
policing.
Many disentanglement policies also seek to address
discriminatory barriers to accessing police services. When local law
enforcement officials are involved in federal immigration policy,
policing practices can discourage immigrants and individuals in mixed
status families from cooperating with the police as victims of or
witnesses to crime.87
Beside the Fourteenth Amendment,88 which bars state officials
from intentional discrimination (based on, inter alia, race, ethnicity,

v. Clackamas Cty., No. 3:12–cv–02317–ST, 2014 WL 1414305 at *11 (D. Or. Apr. 4, 2014).
82. See, e.g., Attorney General Kamala D. Harris Issues Bulletin to Law Enforcement on
Federal Immigration Detainers (June 25, 2014), https://www.oag.ca.gov/news/pressreleases/attorney-general-kamala-d-harris-issues-bulletin-law-enforcement-federal.
83. Lasch et al., supra note 10, at 1760 (citing Lunn v. Commonwealth, 78 N.E.3d 1143
(Mass. 2017)).
84. Id. at 1764-65.
85. Id. at 1767.
86. See, e.g., Devon W. Carbado & Cheryl I. Harris, Undocumented Criminal Procedure,
58 UCLA L. REV. 1543, 1545-47 (2011) (discussing the use of race as a proxy for citizenship).
87. Lasch et al., supra note 10, at 1768.
88. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
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nationality, an alienage),89 Title VI of the 1964 Civil Rights Act
prohibits discrimination in state and local federally funded programs.90
Moreover, states and localities often have their own antidiscrimination
protections.
5. Encouraging Diversity and Inclusivity
A fifth basis for sanctuary policies—which is also centered more
directly on the human rights of immigrants—is promoting inclusive
and diverse communities.91 For example, the sanctuary policies in
Santa Monica, California reflects these concerns.92 President Trump
has made numerous statements and supported policies that are viewed
as undermining inclusivity and even racist. In response to what Santa
Monica’s mayor described as steps by the Trump administration that
failed to “align with our vision of diversity and inclusion,”93 the city
adopted a 2017 resolution that rooted a new policing policy in the
city’s embrace of diversity based on religion, race, national or ethnic
origin, gender, and sexual identity or orientation.94
Promoting inclusive and diverse communities “is related to but
distinct from the more legalistic emphasis on equality and
nondiscrimination that is seen in some disentanglement policies.”95
The goal of inclusivity is more forward-looking, in contrast to the
backward-looking goal of remediating past discriminatory practices in
the criminal justice system and in police services.96
C. The Treatment of Immigrants as a Tipping Problem
Just as not all climate change mitigation steps taken by particular
jurisdictions may be viewed as primarily climate policy per se—but
rather as co-benefits—so too sanctuary jurisdictions adopt policies are
based on a number of grounds. Sanctuary policies framed in more
89. See, e.g., Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944) (holding discrimination
against persons of Japanese ancestry to be presumptively unconstitutional, though upholding
the internment of such persons); Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 372 (1971)
(determining that state classifications based on alienage “are inherently suspect and subject to
close judicial scrutiny”).
90. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d.
91. Lasch et al., supra note 10, at 1766-70.
92. Id. at 1769.
93. Ted Winterer, An Open Letter from Santa Monica Mayor Ted Winterer on Diversity
and
Immigration,
SANTA
MONICA
NEXT
(March
1,
2017),
http://www.santamonicanext.org/2017/03/an-open-letter-from-santa-monica-mayor-tedwinterer-on-diversity-and-immigration/.
94. Lasch et al., supra note 12, at 1769-70.
95. Id. at 1769.
96. Id.
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pragmatic terms—and that build alliances with law enforcement—may
have greater appeal in red and purple localities states.
While the first wave of sanctuary policies involved religious
leaders who sought to actively prevent federal immigration officials
from deporting Central American refugees who faced persecution at
home, “[t]oday’s sanctuary laws, while bearing the same name, are
markedly different.”97 Rather than blocking federal action, today’s
sanctuary jurisdictions are simply stepping aside so that they will not
be involved in federal immigration policy at all. Asserting its interest
in local sovereignty and criminal justice, California’s attorney general,
Xavier Becerra, has noted, “California is in the business of public
safety, not in the business of deportations.”98
Even while often framed in pragmatic terms, these policies have
the effect of responding to the intimidation, exclusion, and humiliation
of federal immigration policy. While these sanctuary jurisdictions do
not have the power, nor are they necessarily seeking to provide legal
citizenship to undocumented immigrants, these policies often
demonstrate the importance of factors beyond legal citizenship,
including broader norms of inclusion, equality, family unification,
respect, and dignity.99
CONCLUSION
As mentioned in the acknowledgement at the outset of this essay,
as this goes to press, the COVD-19 pandemic has ravaged
communities across the world, posing enormous challenges for
governance at every level. While this essay was written prior to the
pandemic and cannot able to account for these challenges, I add these
concluding remarks as a postscript for future lines of research.
As regards COVID-19 relief for immigrants, the federal relief
provided pursuant to the Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic
Security Act (CARES Act) and Families First Coronavirus Response
Act contain provisions excluding undocumented workers and mixedstatus families from eligibility for COVID-19 stimulus checks and
97. Peter L. Markowitz, Trump Can’t Stop the Sanctuary Movement, N.Y. TIMES (Mar.
9,
2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/09/opinion/trump-california-sanctuarymovement.html.
98. Id.
99. Jennifer M. Chacón, Citizenship Matters: Conceptualizing Belongings in an Era of
Fragile Inclusions, 52 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1 (2018).

POWELL (DO NOT DELETE)

2020]

BLUE STATES, RED STATES: THE UNITED STATES?

2/21/21 1:01 PM

155

coverage of coronavirus testing.100 However, a few state and local
governments have stepped forward to provide various forms of relief
to many of these workers and families.101
As for climate policy, while COVID-19 has reduced autoemissions, the United Nations reports that this reduction alone will not
stop climate change.102 Meanwhile, just as President Trump has taken
steps to withdraw from the Paris climate accord, he has also threatened
to cut U.S. funding to the World Health Organization (WHO).
In light of these preliminary observations—as well as the
significant role of states and cities in responding to the health crisis
more broadly—additional research on the links between glocalization
and federalism would be valuable.103
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